Constitution and the Falling Elevator: The Continuing Incompatibility of Materialism and Resurrection Belief by Loose, Jonathan J.
PhilosoPhia Christi
Vol. 14, No. 2  © 2012
Constitution and the Falling Elevator
The Continuing Incompatibility 
of Materialism and Resurrection Belief
JoNathaN loose
Heythrop College, University of London
Kensington Square, London
In order to maintain a rational belief in life after death, one should be 
able to show how it is at least possible that a person who has died may yet 
EHIRXQGWRH[LVWDWDODWHUWLPH7KLVLVGLI¿FXOWLI\RXEHOLHYHWKDWSHUVRQV
are identical with their bodies, since at death bodies become corpses which 
disappear. How can there be postmortem existence if it is the person who 
decays in the grave, and whose atoms are gradually assimilated by various 
other things? The traditional answer that a person is or possesses a nonmate-
rial soul is energetically resisted by a number of Christian scholars. A recent, 
prominent example is N. T. Wright who claims that, “we do not need what 
KDVEHHQFDOOHGµGXDOLVP¶WRKHOSXVRYHUWKHDZNZDUGJDSEHWZHHQERGLO\
death and bodily resurrection.”1
Philosophers sharing Wright’s intuition have looked for ways to under-
stand the human person and life after death without dualism. One suggestion 
is that entirely physical persons may nevertheless be distinct from their bod-
ies, and that a Christian view of life after death can thus be maintained by 
accepting either a temporal gap in existence between death and resurrection, 
or the possibility that death does not bring about the end of the earthly body. 
I will argue that these suggestions do not help the Christian materialist, and 
that recent work defending the theory that bodies continue to exist after death 
does not save it from either incoherence or absurdity.
aBStraCt: Ontological dualism is energetically resisted by a range of Christian scholars includ-
ing philosophers such as Baker and Corcoran who defend accounts of human persons based on 
material constitution. Whilst Baker’s view fails to account for diachronic identity, Corcoran’s 
account of life after death makes use of Zimmerman’s problematic “Falling Elevator Model.” 
It is argued that Zimmerman’s recent reassessment of the model overestimates its value for 
materialists. In fact, the model generates either a fatal encounter with the nature of identity, or 
absurdity. A lack of alternatives is illustrated by anticriterialist proposals. Thus it seems materi-
alism and resurrection belief remain incompatible.
17:ULJKW ³0LQG6SLULW6RXODQG%RG\$OO IRU2QHDQG2QH$OO5HÀHFWLRQVRQ
Paul’s Anthropology in His Complex Contexts,” Society of Christian Philosophers, regional 
meeting, Fordham University, March 18, 2011, http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_Mind-
SpiritSoulBody.htm.
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To begin, consider the question of how a thing existing at one time might 
be identical to a thing existing at another. There is an important tradition that 
this question should be answered in different ways for artefacts and persons. 
In the case of artefacts, identity seems to be both graded and arbitrary. For 
example, it is reasonable to ask how many planks of a wooden ship can be 
replaced before the original ship becomes something different. In the case 
of persons, however, identity seems to be an all-or-nothing, absolutist affair, 
and so we expect that a person observed at one moment either is or is not 
identical with a person observed at a different moment. Because of this, we 
can doubt that two persons observed at different moments are identical even 
if there is a high degree of qualitative similarity between them (for example, 
there may be two separate occasions on which we have indistinguishable ex-
periences of meeting one of a pair of identical twins, but we have no trouble 
accepting that they are distinct persons). We can also accept that two persons 
are identical even if there is a high degree of qualitative difference between 
them (for example, we accept that we could meet a baby and then an adult 
who would be utterly different, and yet be the same person). The distinct, ab-
solutist character of personal identity was defended in the eighteenth century 
by both Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid, who took a Simple View, believing 
that identity cannot be established on the basis of facts about the physical 
world or experience.2
So, is it possible to accept both the absolutist nature of personal iden-
tity and the possibility of resurrection whilst remaining a materialist? Lynne 
Baker has argued that it is, building her case on the assumption that when 
one looks at a single hunk of matter, one may in fact be looking at more than 
one object. She argues that two objects can be united in such a way that one 
constitutes the other without being identical with it.3 For example, consider 
a statue constituted by a particular lump of copper. To compress the copper 
into a sphere would be to destroy the statue but not the lump. The two thus 
have different persistence conditions and are not identical. Instead, they are 
numerically distinct objects sharing the same space and matter. Given that 
there are two objects, some of the properties attributed to the unity will be es-
sential properties of the statue and only derived properties of the lump (con-
sider “being admired by millions”), whilst for others the reverse will be true 
(consider “hardness”). Baker argues that what goes for copper statues also 
goes for embodied persons. Thus persons and bodies are separate objects that 
share the same material basis. A person also has as an essential property the 
FDSDFLW\IRUD¿UVWSHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYH; the ability to think of oneself as an 
individual subject of experience.
2. Joseph Butler, “Of Personal Identity,” in 7KH$QDORJ\RI5HOLJLRQ, in 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 
ed. John Perry (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Thomas Reid, (VVD\VRQWKH 
Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. A. D. Woozley (London: Macmillan, 1941).
3. Lynne Baker, 3HUVRQVDQG%RGLHV$&RQVWLWXWLRQ9LHZ (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000).
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Given this view, the continuation of a particular person over time re-
TXLUHVWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRIDSDUWLFXODU¿UVWSHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYH6LQFHD¿UVW
person perspective cannot be possessed by degrees, the view entails the ab-
solutist account of identity we have been looking for. However, Baker claims 
DQG+DVNHU HPSKDVL]HV WKDWZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ ¿UVWSHUVRQ SHUVSHFWLYHV
“the Constitution View has no non-circular . . . account of personal identity 
over time.”4 Nevertheless, Baker does argue that when human persons and 
their bodies are considered together, identity at different moments becomes 
explicable and “consists in necessary sameness of constituting bodies at each 
of the times.”5 In his own constitution account, Kevin Corcoran makes the 
related claim that “human persons are essentially constituted by the human 
bodies that do, in fact, constitute them.”6 Thus, we may conclude that on a 
constitution view, an account of the resurrection of a human person requires 
an explanation of how a particular body could persist through death. Corco-
ran discusses how such an explanation might be given.
Corcoran rightly argues that persistence cannot be due to continuity of 
the same matter, since bodies are themselves constituted objects, and the 
matter constituting a body is being gradually and continually replaced over 
time. Instead, he suggests that identity relies on immanent causal connec-
tion: an ongoing self-sustaining causal process by which a body maintains 
itself.7 He writes, “A body persists in virtue of the fact that the atoms that are 
caught up in a life-preserving (causal) relation at one time pass on that life-
preserving causal relation to successive swarms of atoms.”8
Corcoran discusses two main ways that a body in this world could be 
immanent causally connected with a body in the next. First, he argues that 
there could be a temporal gap in existence such that pre- and post-gap bodies 
remain immanent causally connected. Second he suggests that there could be 
a process through which death leads to survival rather than extinction of the 
body such that there is no break in the immanent causal chain. 
Corcoran’s argument for temporal gaps does not succeed. Any causal 
LQÀXHQFHRI WKHSUHJDSERG\RQ WKHSRVWJDSERG\PXVWEHFRQYH\HGE\
a third party, and so cannot be immanent; there is no obvious way that the 
identity-preserving immanent causal connection could be passed across a 
gap in existence. His evidence that this leap can in fact occur amounts to 
the claim that it must be possible since resurrection is promised in Christian 
4. Ibid., 138; William Hasker, “The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique,” International 
3KLORVRSKLFDO4XDUWHUO\44 (2004): 23–34.
5. Baker, 3HUVRQVDQG%RGLHV, 138.
6. Kevin Corcoran, 5HWKLQNLQJ+XPDQ1DWXUH$&KULVWLDQ0DWHULDOLVW$OWHUQDWLYHWR WKH
Soul (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 68–9.
7. Contrast immanent and transeunt causation. Zimmerman writes, “In transeunt causality, 
says Johnson, the cause occurrence and the effect occurrence are referred to different continu-
ants, whereas in immanent causality cause occurrence and effect occurrence are attributed to the 
same continuant” (Dean W. Zimmerman, “Immanent Causation,” 1RXV31 (1997): 433).
8. Corcoran, 5HWKLQNLQJ+XPDQ1DWXUH, 72.
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scripture. He admits that he “hasn’t a clue” how it might happen,9 and specu-
ODWHVWKDWSHUKDSV³ZKDWPDNHVWKH¿UVWVWDJHRIWKHSRVWJDSERG\DGLIIHUHQW
stage of the [numerically] same pre-gap body that perished is that God makes 
it so.”10*RHW]KDVLGHQWL¿HGWKHSUREOHPZLWK&RUFRUDQ¶VVSHFXODWLRQQRW-
ing that it is simply confused to suggest that anything other than the identity 
conditions of a body can determine its persistence conditions, and thus God’s 
causal role in the process could not achieve the desired result.11
In addition, Corcoran cannot rely on a limited scriptural picture to defend 
immanent causal connection across a temporal gap, since scripture promises 
ERWKresurrection after death, and existence between the two.12 For example, 
even Wright’s recent anti-dualistic writing contains the claim that “Paul is 
of course clear about ultimate resurrection, and hence about an intermediate 
existence.”13 Gappy existence is ruled out by both the demands of immanent 
causal connection, and scriptural teaching about life after death. What, then, 
of the alternative possibility that bodies do not in fact cease to exist at death?
More than three decades ago, Peter van Inwagen suggested that the pos-
sible compatibility of materialism and resurrection could be demonstrated 
on the assumption that the fate of the body is not what it obviously seems to 
be.14 He argued that God could systematically and instantaneously replace 
corpses with identical copies at the moment of death, such that it is a dupli-
cate that is buried while the “real” body is kept by God for a future resur-
rection, thereby guaranteeing identity of person. Van Inwagen did not intend 
to suggest that this is what actually happens, but only to establish the pos-
sibility of materialist resurrection by showing one way in which it might go. 
His account proved unpopular, not least because it entailed God’s systematic 
deception of the bereaved through last-minute body-switching. Dean Zim-
merman has subsequently proposed an alternative that avoids this problem-
9. Ibid., 130.
10. Ibid., 131.
11. Stewart Goetz, “Christian Materialism: A Review Essay of Kevin Corcoran’s 5HWKLQNLQJ
+XPDQ1DWXUH,” Philosophia Christi 9 (2007): 211.
12. John W. Cooper, %RG\6RXODQG WKH/LIH(YHUODVWLQJ%LEOLFDO$QWKURSRORJ\DQG WKH
0RQLVP'XDOLVP'HEDWH (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000); N. T. Wright, 7KH5HVXUUHFWLRQ
of the Son of God (London: SPCK, 2003), chap. 4; John W. Cooper, “Exaggerated Rumors of 
Dualism’s Demise: A Review Essay on %RG\6RXODQG+XPDQ/LIH,” Philosophia Christi 11 
(2009): 453–64. These authors both reject immediate resurrection, and so intermediate exis-
tence has temporal extension.
13. Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body.” Goetz has argued that Wright’s rejection of dual-
ism is unnecessary. He argues that the New Testament authors and audience assumed a com-
mon, generic, prephilosophical dualism distinct from developing Greek thought DERXWdualism 
that Wright rejects. Goetz sees issues of anthropology and morality in the New Testament as 
analogous, citing C. S. Lewis’s argument that the New Testament does not seek to innovate in 
such matters (Goetz, “Is N. T. Wright Right about Substance Dualism?,” Philosophia Christi 
14 (2012): 183–91).
14. Peter van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” International Journal for the Phi-
ORVRSK\RI5HOLJLRQ 9 (1978): 114–21.
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atic implication,15 and Corcoran offers Zimmerman’s proposal to those who 
cannot accept the possibility of temporal gaps.
Zimmerman’s suggestion runs as follows: God could cause the simples 
that make up the body of a person, A, to EXG (or, in the original version, to 
¿VVLRQ) such that there come to be two identically structured sets of simples; 
one in this world C, and one in the next %. Each of these products inherits 
the life-preserving causal relation from A. Thus, the self-sustaining causal 
process that had been passed down a single path during A’s earthly life now 
continues down two separate and unrelated paths in two different worlds. 
Crucially, the body C in this world immediately goes on to constitute a non-
living corpse, while the body % in the next world, suitably healed, functions 
as the sole and therefore successful candidate for the continuation of the pre-
¿VVLRQOLIH=LPPHUPDQQDPHGWKLVLGHDWKH)DOOLQJ(OHYDWRU0RGHO)(0
because it describes a last-minute escape from annihilation, just as a cartoon 
character might escape death from a falling elevator by having it stop an inch 
IURPWKHJURXQGVRWKDWKHFDQVWHSRXWRILW'RHVWKLVLGHDRSHQWKHZD\WR
belief in the possibility of survival given both materialism about persons, and 
the impossibility of gappy existence?
In short, this seems extremely unlikely. The decisive problem for the 
Falling Elevator idea is that it shows that immanent causal connection is 
a conceivably duplicable relation. It is therefore an example of a closest-
FRQWLQXHU WKHRU\ DQG VXEMHFW WR WKHGLI¿FXOWLHV FRPPRQO\ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
these.16
7RLOOXVWUDWHWKHGLI¿FXOW\LPDJLQHDEXGGLQJSURFHVVWKDWRFFXUVLQWKH
life of a child, A, and which produces both a body % in the next world, and 
a body CLQWKLVZRUOG1RZFRPSDUHWZRVLWXDWLRQV,QWKH¿UVWWKHUHVXOW
of the budding process is that C is a corpse, whilst % is a living body in the 
next world. The budding has been “VLQJO\VXFFHVVIXO,” resulting in only one 
child in the next world. Thus, we would conclude that A has VXUYLYHGLQWRWKH
QH[WZRUOGEHLQJLGHQWLFDOWR%. In the second situation things are different 
because C does not become a corpse, but remains a functioning body in this 
world. In this second situation, the budding has been “GRXEO\VXFFHVVIXO,” 
and has resulted in two children inhabiting different worlds. What do we 
conclude about the fate of A this time? Since without a “budding” event, A 
would have continued in this world, we might assume that this is also what 
happens here. Thus, in the second situation A has VXUYLYHGLQWKLVZRUOGEH-
ing identical to C, and a new person, %, has been created in the next world.
Now compare the two situations just outlined. Note that the identity of % 
after budding is different in each situation, and is dependent on the fate of C; 
a body that is entirely unrelated to it. Thus, if C is a corpse, then in the next 
15. Dean W. Zimmerman, “Materialism and Survival: The Falling Elevator Model,” )DLWK
DQG3KLORVRSK\ 16 (1999): 194–211.
16. Bernard Williams, “Personal Identity and Individuation,” Proceedings of the Aristote-
OLDQ6RFLHW\ 57 (1956): 229–52.
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world % continues the life of A. However, if C is not a corpse, then % is a new 
person. It seems absurd that this should be the case, and it is widely agreed 
that identity cannot function this way. Harold Noonan emphasizes this with 
his “only X and Y” principle (“OXY”) which may be stated in terms of A 
and % as follows:
Whether a later individual % is identical with an earlier individual A can 
depend only on facts about A and % and the relationships between them: it 
cannot depend upon facts about any individuals other than A or % (such as 
C).17
The denial of OXY may be more than absurd. This is because to deny 
OXY is to deny the necessity of identity. If two things are identical, then 
they are identical necessarily; they are identical in every possible world. Yet, 
we have already seen that in the case of % and A there is a possible world in 
which they are not identical, crucially dependent on the fate of C. So identity 
is being treated as a contingent rather than a necessary relation.18
Another consequence of the nature of identity is that we cannot in fact 
suggest that a doubly successful budding might lead to the continuation of 
A’s earthly life. This is incoherent because each of the products of a doubly 
successful budding would have equal claim to identity with A, and so either 
both would continue A’s life or neither would. Since it is not possible that 
one thing can be two things, neither % nor C can in fact be identical with A. 
Bizarrely, A has “budded out of existence.” The Falling Elevator’s clash with 
the necessity and transitivity of identity, if real, is fatal for it.19
Corcoran recognizes the problem, and admits that he does not know 
why the immanent causal connections that allow A’s life to persist can be 
transmitted in one direction but not another.20 The argument is reduced to the 
claim this must be the case, as Corcoran suggests that “there must be some-
thing in the nature of immanent causal connections that prevents the relation 
from ever going both ways.”21
At this point it seems that neither temporal gaps nor bodily survival 
will provide the account of life after death that Corcoran is after. It may be, 
then, that immanent causation simply fails to provide an adequate account of 
17. Harold Noonan, 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\ (New York: Routledge, 2003), 129.
18. See, e.g., Joseph Baltimore, “Got to Have Soul,” 5HOLJLRXV6WXGLHV 42 (2006): 417–30.
19. See also William Hasker, 7KH (PHUJHQW 6HOI (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999).
20. Corcoran, 5HWKLQNLQJ+XPDQ1DWXUH, 133. Corcoran’s suggestion that he has provided 
evidence that, “it can never be the case that a competitor for identity with my body can exist” is 
mystifying, since he refers only to the claim contained in the next footnote.
21. Corcoran writes, “I frankly admit that I cannot say what ingredient in immanent causa-
tion accounts for this. But neither have I claimed that a completely informative account of the 
relations is available. Perhaps the relation itself, or at the very least some ingredient in it, must 
be treated as primitive” (Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival without Tempo-
ral Gaps,” in 6RXO%RG\DQG6XUYLYDO(VVD\VLQWKH0HWDSK\VLFVRI+XPDQ3HUVRQV, ed. Kevin 
Corcoran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 216).
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resurrection. Corcoran thus offers a further suggestion that a God who exists 
necessarily and who has the essential characteristic of willing the good for 
human persons would not and could not allow a situation to arise in which a 
KXPDQSHUVRQLVDQQLKLODWHGWKURXJKD¿VVLRQRUEXGGLQJSURFHVVWKDWJHQ-
erates two equal competitors. However it is unclear that annihilation could 
QHYHU be consistent with God’s willing the good for human persons, and if 
it wereFRQVLVWHQWWKHQWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWRUXOHRXW¿VVLRQDVDPHWKRG*RG
could use to bring it about.
If bodily persistence is to provide an account of life after death, then 
RQHPXVW¿QGDZD\IRUWKH)DOOLQJ(OHYDWRUWRDYRLGLWVWHUPLQDOHQFRXQWHU
with the necessity of identity. Noonan has suggested ways to reconceive ar-
guments of this type in order to achieve this,22 and Zimmerman has recently 
made use of one of Noonan’s suggestions in defending the Falling Elevator 
Model.23 Does this defence succeed and thus demonstrate the possibility of 
life after death on the constitution view?
Zimmerman considers the situation in which he himself survives a dou-
bly successful childhood budding, subsequently living out his earthly life 
before meeting the other product of the budding in the next world. A peculiar 
PHHWLQJQRGRXEW+RZVKRXOGKHH[SODLQWKHSHFXOLDULW\",QRUGHUWRDYRLG
denying the necessity of identity, Zimmerman takes Noonan’s suggestion 
that the situation could be reconceived in terms of the relation of constitution 
rather than identity.24 The products of the budding process are thus not bod-
ies in competition for identity with A, but hunks of matter in competition to 
come to constitute A at a later time. Zimmerman writes:
Instead of saying that I could have been identical to the child, I should 
have said: “Had my matter been destroyed at the point of budding, 
the matter [rather than body] which was caused to appear in the next 
world by the budding of the particles would have constituted [rather 
WKDQµEHHQLGHQWLFDOWR¶@PHDQGQRWWKLVFKLOG,QWKRVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
this child would not have existed.”25
Zimmerman accepts that such an explanation is odd, but not that it is absurd. 
He thus argues that interpreting the Falling Elevator in constitution terms 
provides a solution to the materialist at an acceptable cost. Noonan disagrees 
with Zimmerman’s conclusion. In fact, he describes the constitution route as 
22. Noonan, 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 157–8, notes that a four-dimensionalist could suggest in the 
case of a doubly successful budding there were two persons in existence all along, sharing a 
temporal part throughout their earthly lives. This is Nozick’s view in his original discussion of 
closest continuer theories, but is not pursued here since many including Baker, Corcoran, and 
Zimmerman reject four-dimensionalism.
23. See Noonan, 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 135; Dean W. Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection: The 
Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” in 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\DQG5HVXUUHFWLRQ+RZ'R:H6XUYLYH
2XU'HDWK", ed. Georg Gasser (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), chap. 2.
24. Noonan, 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 132–3.
25. Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection,” 43.
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DOHDSRXWRIWKHIU\LQJSDQRIFRQWLQJHQWLGHQWLW\DQGLQWRWKH¿UHRIDEVXU-
dity.26
Before we consider that absurdity, we should note that, under this view, 
we still have no explanation of how a life-preserving causal relation might 
go in one direction rather than another when there are multiple candidates, 
and so even if the constitution view successfully avoids the problem of con-
tingent identity, these problems require additional ad hoc constraints. OXY 
is still denied; the question of whether or not the next-worldly product of 
budding will come to constitute Zimmerman remains dependent on the fate 
of the this-worldly product. Whilst this may no longer entail a clash with the 
nature of identity, it remains highly implausible. For example, it implies that 
Zimmerman could say to the other product of budding: “You should consider 
yourself fortunate that the budding process was successful in the case of the 
matter constituting me, just as it was for the matter constituting you. If the 
process had failed to produce the matter constituting me, then \RX would 
not have existed.” Surely such a statement is absurd, and not simply “odd.” 
Noonan thinks it so, and important enough to rule out closest continuer theo-
ries of personal identity, including the Falling Elevator. In case we remain 
unconvinced, he also points to other absurd consequences such as the claim 
that the same events can constitute the origin of different things.
Consider the singly successful and doubly successful budding situations 
FRPSDUHGHDUOLHU ,Q WKH¿UVW GRXEO\ VXFFHVVIXOEXGGLQJ VLWXDWLRQ WKH OLIH
of A continues on earth as C, and in the second singly successful budding 
situation, the life of A continues in the next world as %,QWKH¿UVWVLWXDWLRQ
the budding event, along with all the prior events making up the previous 
life of A are the progenitors of a new person in the QH[W world. In the second 
situation, those same events fail to be the progenitors of a new person, since 
in that case the next-worldly product of budding is the continuation of an 
already existing person. Yet, it is absurd to claim that identical sets of events 
can produce different things.27
Noonan also asks whether situations such as those just compared can 
really be described as different. Of course, it would be absurd to claim that a 
situation in which a next-worldly person is identical to A is no different to the 
situation in which the next-worldly person is not identical to A, but it turns 
out that this is what is being claimed.
26. Noonan, 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 133.
27. Noonan also points out that closest continuer theories entail that identical events can 
turn out to be part of the history of different things. Consider two events, one in the life of A, 
and one in the life of %. If the life of % is a continuation of the life of A, then these events are a 
part of the history of a single individual. However, if % is someone else, then these same events 
are not a part of that history despite the fact that the events are identical in each situation. Yet 
it is absurd to claim that identical events can be part of the history of different things (Noonan, 
3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\, 134).
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In order to understand this, we need to distinguish two types of changes. 
We might contrast real changes with what Peter Geach termed “mere Cam-
bridge changes.” Consider an example in which my son grows taller than 
me. When that happens, he and I have both changed. He has acquired the 
property of being taller than his father, while I have acquired the property of 
being shorter than my son. However, the change in my son is real, because 
he has grown, whereas the change in me is of a different kind, because I have 
not grown. In Geach’s terms, the difference in me is a “mere Cambridge 
change.”
Given this distinction between real and mere Cambridge changes, con-
sider again the situation of % in the next world. Whether or not % continues 
the life of A depends on the fate of the causally unrelated, and spatiotempo-
rally distinct budding product C. Thus, from %’s point of view, the differ-
ences in the situation dependent on the fate of C can only be mere Cambridge 
differences. There are no real differences between the situations analogous 
to my son growing taller than me, but only Cambridge differences analogous 
to my becoming shorter than my son. However, normally two situations are 
considered identical even if there are Cambridge differences between them. 
In other words, Cambridge changes are not normally regarded as events.28 
Thus, we should consider the situation in which % is the continuation of A 
to be identical to the situation in which % is not the continuation of A. This, 
again is absurd.
Zimmerman does not consider the range of Noonan’s objections in de-
tail, but these do in fact suggest that he is mistaken to claim that the constitu-
tion version of the Falling Elevator model can be held with minimal cost. If 
materialists must “learn to love the closest continuer theory” as he suggests, 
then they are learning to love either the incoherent or the absurd. The Falling 
Elevator leads either to a fatal collision with the necessity of identity, or to 
absurdity. Either way, the problems are serious.
Objections of other kinds have been raised against the Falling Elevator 
model. For example, David Hershenov has argued for an assimilation princi-
ple.29 He claims that it is not possible for all the matter constituting a body to 
be changed simultaneously as the model suggests it must be. Rather, ongoing 
identity requires continual overlap of old and new particles. Zimmerman has 
recently explored what such an assimilation principle might look like if it is 
to rule out the falling elevator process.30 He believes that it would require 
¿UPDFFHSWDQFH RI WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW DOO SK\VLFDO REMHFWV DUH XOWLPDWHO\
composed of partless particles. However, he argues that such an assumption 
is inconsistent with discussions of the nature of matter in modern physics, 
28. Ibid., 137.
29. David B. Hershenov, “Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of 
Resurrection,” 5HOLJLRXV6WXGLHV 38 (2002): 451–69.
30. Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection,” 45–8.
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unsupported by compelling argument, and not required by the Falling Eleva-
tor account.
Zimmerman does suggest that there could be a ZHDN assimilation prin-
ciple that does not require this problematic assumption about the nature of 
matter. The weak assimilation principle would state that a living thing can-
not lose all its proper parts at once, and it may turn out to be consistent 
with the Falling Elevator idea. However, in order to be so, Zimmerman must 
guarantee that at least one proper part makes it to the next world. Since the 
only things that can make it to the next world are things that cease to exist 
at death, Zimmerman must assume that as a matter of necessity, whenever a 
living thing dies there is at least one proper part that also ceases to exist. If 
it can also go on to the next world via the Falling Elevator method, then it is 
guaranteed that the assimilation principle would never be violated. However, 
Zimmerman is wisely skeptical of the idea that when the life of an organism 
ends, some proper part of the organism must also cease to exist.31
It seems, then, that notions of material constitution and immanent cau-
sation fail to provide a way to avoid dualism whilst maintaining the Simple 
View of personal identity and life after death. Temporal gaps in existence are 
inconsistent with both immanent causal connection and Christian scripture, 
and the Falling Elevator Model faces absurdity despite its attempt to dodge 
the fatal bullet of contingent identity. The model is also uncertain at best if 
immanent causal continuity cannot be preserved through a complete change 
of matter. At present no reasonable account of life after death is apparent 
given Corcoran’s anthropological assumptions.
So, can the materialist hope for an alternative account of identity con-
sistent with the Simple View of Butler and Reid? This, too, is unlikely. One 
alternative is to simply take personal identity over time to be a brute fact. 
Thus Merricks follows others such as Mavrodes in arguing that neither facts 
about the physical world and experience nor appeals to the soul can provide 
an adequate criterion for establishing identity over time, but that identity just 
is a fundamental feature of the physical world.32 No explanation of identity 
over temporal gaps is thus required.33 However, to turn to anticriterialism is 
to deny the intuition that has driven the entire discussion; that there must be 
31. Other recent objections include Olson’s concern that “even if your atoms could reliably 
¿QGWKHQH[WZRUOGWKH\FRXOGQRWSRVVLEO\NQRZZKHUHDQGZKHQWRUHDSSHDUVRWKDWWKHUHVXOW
was a living human being and not simply a cloud, widely dispersed across space and time. It 
might happen, perhaps, but it would be fantastically unlikely” (Olson, “Immanent Causation 
and Life after Death,” in 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\DQG5HVXUUHFWLRQ+RZ'R:H6XUYLYH2XU'HDWK", 
ed. Georg Gasser (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), chap. 3. However, Zimmerman responds 
with ways to achieve this restructuring (Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection,” 48–50).
32. Trenton Merricks, “How to Live Forever without Saving Your Soul,” in 6RXO%RG\
DQG6XUYLYDO(VVD\VLQWKH0HWDSK\VLFVRI+XPDQ3HUVRQV, ed. Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), 183–200.
33. George Mavrodes, “The Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity,” 1RXV 11 
(1977): 27–9.
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something in virtue of which two persons at different times might be identi-
cal. In addition, van Horn shows that Merricks’s own view provides only 
OLPLWHGVXSSRUW WR WKH&KULVWLDQJLYHQ LWVGLI¿FXOWLHV LQDFFRXQWLQJ IRU WKH
incarnation.34
Of course, it is possible that the only explanations remaining would be 
dualistic. Baker now suggests that there might be an adequate dualist account 
of personal identity, although she argues that ultimately, souls are ruled out 
EHFDXVH WKH\DUH³VXUGV´ LQQDWXUH IDLOLQJ WR¿W LQZLWK WKHZRUOGDVGLV-
covered by the natural sciences;35 Corcoran recognizes that dualists have a 
“much easier time accommodating post-mortem survival”;36 Of course, Zim-
merman is in fact a dualist, regularly referring to his limited need of his own 
)DOOLQJ(OHYDWRUVWRU\+HZULWHV³,RIIHU3HWHU>YDQ,QZDJHQ@WKLVµMXVWVR
story,’ to do with as he will, with my compliments. I’m glad I’m a dualist 
with less need of it.”37*LYHQWKHUDQJHRIGLI¿FXOWLHVVXUYH\HGIRUPDWHULDOLVW
accounts, I conclude by repeating the comment with which Zimmerman be-
gan his account of the Falling Elevator Model: “It is not easy to be a materi-
alist and yet believe that there is a way for human beings to survive death.”38 
It is clear that this is, in fact, an understatement.
34. Luke Van Horn, “Merricks’s Soulless Savior,” )DLWKDQG3KLORVRSK\ 27 (2010): 330–41.
35. Lynne Baker, “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection,” in 3HUVRQDO,GHQWLW\DQG
5HVXUUHFWLRQ+RZ'R:H6XUYLYH2XU'HDWK", ed. Georg Gasser (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2010), chap. 9.
36. Corcoran, 5HWKLQNLQJ+XPDQ1DWXUH, 133. Corcoran goes on to question the relationship 
between accounts of resurrection and accounts of survival.
³&RPPHQWRQYDQ,QZDJHQ¶Vµ'XDOLVPDQG0DWHULDOLVP¶´OHFWXUHDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI
Notre Dame, November 3, 1994; see Hasker, 7KH(PHUJHQW6HOI, 225.
38. Zimmerman, “Materialism and Survival,” 194.
